Violation of environmental regulations as a disinvestment in social capital by Gren, Ing-Marie et al.
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
04/2014 
 
Violation of environmental regulations as a disinvestment in social capital 
 
Gren, Ing-Mariea*, Andersson Franko, Mikaela, Holstein Fredrika 
 
a Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Box 7013, 750 07 
Uppsala, Sweden.  
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 18 671753.  Fax: +46 18 67 35 02. E-mail:  
ing-marie.gren@slu.se 
 
 
 
 
 
   Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet, Institutionen för ekonomi  Working Paper Series 2014:04 
   Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Economics  Uppsala 2014 
 
   ISSN 1401-4068 
   ISRN SLU-EKON-WPS-1404-SE Corresponding author:  
                                                                                                                                  Ing-Marie.gren@slu.se 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
  
  
 
 
 
Violation of environmental regulations as a disinvestment in social capital 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper developed a simple dynamic model in order to analyse the impact of social capital on 
violation of environmental regulations. Two main channels of influence were identified; through 
informal enforcement of regulations and through effects on costs from disinvestment in social 
capital caused by violation.  The model was tested using survey data on enforcement and 
violation of command and control regulations at municipalities and counties in Sweden. Four 
different measures on the social capital variable were used; general trust, trust in local and 
national governments, and organizational activity. Count data models were used for estimating 
the explanatory power of these variables in relation to inspection frequency and control variables 
of community characteristics. Statistically best results were obtained for organizational activity 
for all firm categories. The results showed that both the level of this social capital measure and 
its growth over time curb violation.  
 
Key words: social capital, violation of environmental regulations, econometric test, count data 
model, Sweden. 
 
JEL: K33, K42, Q58 
 
 
 
3 
  
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The concept of social capital can be traced to Hanifan (1916) but it was not until 1980s that it 
was defined in a way that is commonly used today; as a link between individuals (Coleman 
1988). The concept emerged from the need of explaining cooperative behaviour among 
individuals when they have little economic incentives to do so (e.g. Boix and Posner 1998). A 
common component of the many existing approaches to and definitions of social capital is 
related to expectation of reciprocity in cooperation. If people expect others to engage in and 
comply with agreements beneficial for the community but not so much for the individual they 
will do the same. The last decades have witnessed the development of a large body of literature 
on the empirical evidences of the role of social capital for the enforcement of the rule of law  
(e.g. Glaeser et al. 1996; Lederman et al. 2002; Lazzarini et al. 2004; Yamamura 2009).  
However, in spite of Ostrom’s seminal contribution on the role of social capital for sustainable 
management of common pool resources (Ostrom 1990), the literature on social capital and 
enforcement of environmental regulations rules is scant. Abundance of social capital may be of 
particular importance for compliance with environmental regulations because of the difficulty in 
connecting violations of ambient environmental standards to the activities of specific firms.  The 
purpose of this study is to develop and test a model of firm violation behaviour in the presence of 
social capital and formal enforcement. Econometric tests are carried out for compliance with 
command and control regulations in Sweden.  
 
In principle, the literature identifies two main mechanisms through which social capital can effect 
violation of regulations (e.g. Glaeser et al. 2002). One is through the impact on violating firms’ benefits 
from losses of access to local transactions that build on trust. The other mechanism acts through suspected 
or detected violation. Social capital may facilitate the creation of lobbying activities that result in private 
reporting of environmental activities without permits, and it may create a  damaging impact on firms’ 
transaction by a quick and widespread reputation of the firm as ‘environmental criminal’. However, these 
mechanisms are likely not to act in isolation from formal enforcement, i.e. enforcement by law and public
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bodies, of regulations. There are two main theories on the linkages between formal and informal 
enforcement of rules or contracts; substitution and complementarity (e.g. Lazzarini et al. 2004; Jackson 
2011). According to the substitution perspective, social capital defined in terms of expectations of 
reciprocity creates informal enforcement mechanisms. These can be hampered by formal rules which 
signal the absence of mutual trust and good will with respect to compliance with rules. On the other hand, 
the complementarity view argues that informal agreements can not be sustained without a strong formal 
enforcement power.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study with the explicit aim of assessing the 
impact of social capital on violation of environmental regulations and its interaction with formal 
enforcement.  However, a further investigation of the parameterization of social capital for 
empirical analysis shows that a few studies have included variables that can be attributed to 
social capital although the concept as such was not used.  Two central elements in the 
quantification of social capital is the degree of social trust and number of social contacts in 
organisations (e.g. Coleman 1988; Putman et al. 1993; Rothstein 2003).  A few studies addressed 
one of these elements by including organisational engagement as explanatory variable for non-
compliance in addition to variables reflecting formal enforcement (Kagan et al. 2003; Earnhart 
2004; Langpap and Shimshack 2010).  Kagan et al. (2003) found that local governments, 
environmental activists, and company culture were important factors to explain high level of 
compliance. Earnhart (2004) included voter engagement as an explanatory variable for pollution 
by facilities in the US, but found no significant result.  Langpap and Shimshak (2010) tested the 
relation between private groups’ suits on compliance with regulations under the Clean Water Act 
in the US, and found that private enforcement can act as a complement to public monitoring. One 
study, Jones (2010), had an explicit focus on social capital but investigated its impacts on the 
effectiveness of voluntary waste treatment by households, and not specifically on compliance 
with regulations.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
In contrast to social capital, the effect of formal enforcement on violation has been empirically 
tested in a large body of literature since the seminal contribution by Becker (1968), with a large 
number of studies applied to environmental regulations (see Gray and Shimshack 2011 for a 
review). The variables used for explaining violation are related to the detection of violation and 
penalty if found in violation, which are mostly expressed in terms of inspection design and/or 
penalty (Gray and Deily 1996; Shimshack and Ward 2005; Eckert and Eckert 2010; Earnhart and 
Friesen 2013; Lin 2013; Stafford 2013). Most of these studies show that violation is decreasing 
in inspections and/or penalties. Lin (2013) reports another result where reported pollutant 
emissions in China increase with more frequent inspection, which is explained by the specific 
two tier pollutant levy system and the low penalties.  
 
In our view, the main contribution of this study is the theoretical and empirical investigation of 
the impacts of social capital on violation of environmental regulations, and its interaction with 
formal enforcement. A dynamic model provided the basis for the formulation of three testable 
hypotheses; i) non-compliance is decreasing in formal enforcement and social capital, ii) formal 
enforcement and social capital act either as complements or substitutes, and iii) violation is 
decreasing in the level of growth in social capital. Four different measures of social capital were 
defined; general trust, trust in local and national governments, and civic engagement. The results 
indicated that part of the first hypotheses, decreasing violation in formal enforcement, was 
rejected for all regression models. The other part of the first hypothesis and the other two were 
supported by two measures of social capital;  civic engagement and trust in the national 
government. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a theoretical model used for tracing channels 
of influence on violation of environmental regulations from social capital. The data are presented 
in Section 3, and regression results in Section 4. The paper ends with a summary and discussion 
in section 5.  
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2. A simple model of violation and social capital 
 
A firm i, where i=1,…m firms, subject to environmental regulations in a community k, with 
k=1,..,n, is assumed to violate in period t=1,..,T if associated expected net benefits are positive. 
Benefits of violation, )( ikt
ik VB  where iktV is violation, consist of avoided costs for complying 
with the regulation, such as evaded charge payments or costs of pollutant cleaning devices. The 
identification of violation costs is more involved. A common perception in economics is that the 
cost consists of expected penalty of detected and convicted violation. In general, the expected 
penalty depends on the probability of detection and the size of the penalty for a convicted 
violation. It may very well be the case that the probability of detection in one period depends on 
violation in previous periods, see Gray and Shimshack (2011). A simplification is made in this 
study by assuming that the expected penalty per unit violation in a community, kP , is time 
independent and given to the firm.  
 
Benefits and expected penalty of violation can be regarded as one of several motives for 
compliance with regulations (e.g. Winter and May, 2001). In addition to this so-called calculated 
motive noncompliance can be driven by normative and social motives. The first refers to 
inherent moral values of what is wrong and right, and the second to the search of approval of 
others. We may then consider social capital, or informal enforcement, kS , as a stimulator of 
these three different motives. It can affect the calculated motive through the firm’s believes of 
earning profits, such as losses profits from being regarded as an environmental criminal. The 
normative motive may be stimulated if social capital affects the firm’s opinion of what is right or 
wrong with respect to breaking rules or to degrade the environment. The social motive can be 
impacted if social capital contributes to the firm’s appreciation by the public.  
 
The violation cost is then determined by violation for given levels of formal enforcement, Pk, and 
informal enforcement, ktS ,  and is written as ),;(
k
t
kik
t SPVC . The costs are assumed to be  
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increasing in ktV ,  P
k, and ktS . Formal and informal enforcement can be independent, 
complements or substitutes. We define complementarity (substitution) as 
)',()',()()',',( kt
ik
t
kik
t
k
t
kik
t SVCPVCSPVC +<> . Costs are then higher or lower under 
simultaneous acting of given levels of Pk’ and  'ktS  than under separate consideration. Under 
complementarity, the impact on violation deterrence of a given inspection stringency increases in 
'ktS . On the other hand, when there is substitution P
k replaces, or crowds out, part of the effect of 
k
tS  and violation is then higher than if the enforcement parameters acted separately. 
 
 
It is assumed that social capital in a community k shows an organic development over time, 
k
t
kk
t SS )1(1 θ+=+  where 
kθ  can be positive, negative or zero. When 0)(<>kθ  social capital can 
be regarded as a renewable (degradable) resource, and when  0=kθ   as an exhaustible resource. 
The growth in this resource is reduced by violation of all firms in the community, which is 
written as:  
 
)()1(1
k
t
kk
t
kk
t VFSS −+=+ θ                                                                                         (1) 
kk SS =0  
where  ),...,()( 1 mkt
k
t
kk
t
k VVFVF = , which is increasing in iktV .  
 
Given all assumptions, the firm is assumed to maximise total discounted net benefits over a 
period of time, t=1,…,T, according to 
 
ik
tt
T
t
Max πρ∑ =1                                                                                               (2) 
                      s.t. (1) and 0≥ktS  for i=1,..,n ; k=1,..,l and t=1,..,T 
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where ),,()( kt
kik
t
ikik
t
ikik
t SPVCVB −=π ,  tt r)1(
1
+
=ρ  , and r is the discount rate. The associated 
first-order conditions are obtained from the Hamiltonian, which is constructed as 
 
k
t
k
t
kkk
t
k
t
k
t
kik
t
ik
t
k
t
k
t
ik
t SVFSSPVSVH λθµπρµ +−++= ++ ))()1((),,(),,( 11                    (3) 
 
where  kt 1+µ  are the co-state variables and 
k
tλ are the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the restriction on 
non-negative stocks of social capital. The first-order conditions are 
 
01 =−=∂
∂
+
k
V
k
t
ik
Vtik
t
ik
t
ik
t
F
V
H µπρ    for i=1,..,n ; k=1,..,l and t=1,..,T- 1                            (4) 
k
t
k
t
kik
Sitk
t
k
t k
tS
H λµθπρµ +++=
∂
∂
= +∑ 1)1(      for k=1,..l, and t=1,..,T-1                     (5) 
 kTT
k
T ωρµ =                                              for k=1,..,l                                                   (6) 
 
Assuming interior solutions, solving for kt 1+µ  in (5) and inserting the solution into (4) deliver the 
condition for optimal violation where marginal net benefits are zero, which is written as  
 
0)1( 1 =+− ∑∑ −+−= ikSitTk
T
t
k
V
ik
V ktikt
F
τ
πρθπ ττ
τ
                                                            (7) 
 
The left-hand side of (7) consists of two parts; current marginal net benefit of violation, the first 
term at the LHS, and discounted future streams of net benefits revealed by the second term at the 
LHS.  Without consideration of impact on social capital, the condition includes only current net 
benefits, and it simply states that optimal violation occurs where marginal benefits equal 
marginal costs in each period of time. The additional term at the LHS of (7) extends the 
condition to include discounted future net benefits for all firms in the community from changes 
in social capital caused by the violation of firm i. This can be either positive or negative  
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depending on the sign of ikS kπ . When the firm considers the impact of changes in social capital on 
all firms in the community, eq. (7) corresponds to the optimal violation level in a community 
perspective. If, as is common with many common pool resources, the firm considers only its own 
future net benefits, condition (7) is changed to  
 
0)1( 1 =+− −+−
=∑ ikStTk
T
t
k
V
ik
V kikt
ik
t
F
τ
πρθπ ττ
τ
                                                                   (7’) 
 
According to (7’), social capital can influence optimal violation through two main mechanisms; 
i) on ikV igtπ when formal and informal enforcement are dependent (substitutes or complements), and 
ii) on .ikS kπ   In the first case, a certain level of 
k
tS  will give a lower optimal violation when there 
is complementarity in the enforcement mechanisms compared with when they are substitutes due 
to the reinforcement of violation deterrence by Pk.   
 
With respect to the other mechanism, i.e. through ikS kπ ,  there are three possible cases; 0=
ik
S kπ ,  
0<ikS kπ or 0>
ik
S kπ .  In the first case, the impact on the firm’s profit from a marginal change in 
community social capital is zero, which may occur for relatively small firms. In the second case, 
the optimal level of violation will be lower than without consideration of the dynamic effects of 
disinvestment in social capital. The additional marginal cost created by the decline in social 
capital in period t, kV iktF , corresponds to the foregone net benefits from violation during the entire 
period from t to the end period T. This future cost of disinvestment in social capital is increasing 
in kV iktF , T, and θ
k . If instead 0>ikS kπ  the opposite is the case where violation is higher than 
without the dynamic impact of social capital since the degradation of the capital reduces 
discounted future costs of violation.   
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So far it has been assumed that kVtF <0. The level of 
k
Vt
F  is affected by the perception of 
compliance with environmental regulations compared with other moral duties in community. If 
environmental issue is of little concern and/or the detection rate of violation is almost zero, we 
may have that kVtF =0, and the value of the disinvestment is then zero.  
 
The analytical results allow for the derivation of three main hypothesis with respect to the 
impacts of social capital on violation of the exogenous parameters Pk, 
0
S , and kθ : 
 
1. Violation is decreasing in each of the parameters Pk and 
0
S .   
2. We have no prior expectations about whether formal and informal enforcement 
mechanisms are substitutes or complements, but allow for both possibilities. 
3. Violation is decreasing in kθ , which reflects consideration of the future role of social 
capital.  
 
3 Data retrieval 
 
The main difficulty with respect to data collection is to obtain information on violation and 
associated costs and benefits.  For obvious reasons, it would be difficult to collect the data from a 
survey to firms. Instead, a survey was distributed to Swedish local (275 municipality) and 
regional (21 county board) authorities responsible for supervision of environmental regulations 
(Holstein 2010).  This did not allow for data on benefits of violation, but an approximation of the 
cost was obtained from information on number of visits to regulated firms. This reflects the 
probability of detecting violating firms, which is a part of the expected cost. With respect to 
measurements of social capital, we follow the literature by using general trust and organisation 
activities as variables for social capital. However, before presenting the data in more detail we 
give a brief description of the system of supervision of environmental regulations in Sweden, 
since it guides the choice of several variables and associated measurements. 
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3.1 Brief description of formal enforcement of environmental regulations in Sweden 
 
Environmental protection in Sweden is regulated by the Swedish Environment Protection Act, which was 
enacted in 1969 and was replaced by the Swedish Environmental Code on January 1, 1999 (Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency 2009). The overall objective of the Code is to promote sustainable 
development (Chapter 1, paragraph 1) and in principle, the Code is applicable to all human activities that 
may harm the environment. For example, the Code states that as long as it is technically and financially 
feasible, the best available technology should be used and that an activity should be located so that the 
environmental effects are minimised. However, the Code itself is quite general, while more detailed rules 
are found in Government Ordinances.  An appendix to the Ordinance specifies the activities (type and 
extent) for which notification or permission is required. Activities are then classified in relation to their 
“potential environmental influence”, which is determined by the type and scope of the activity. 
Accordingly, firms are classified into four different categories, A, B, C and U, where firms in category A 
have the largest environmental impact and firms in category U the smallest.  Firms in categories A and B 
require an operating licence. Examples of category A firms are nuclear power plants and firms operating 
in the steel, paper and pulp industries. Large farms and food producers are examples of category B firms. 
The category C firms, such as medium-sized farms, have to report their activities. Firms in category U, 
such as petrol stations and laundries, do not need a licence and do not have to report their activities, but 
are under observation for re-classification into any other category. 
 
 
The Ordinance also prescribes the responsibility for supervision. In general, the municipal authorities are 
responsible for the supervision of category C and U firms, while the county administration boards, or in 
some cases other central government authorities, are responsible for the supervision of category A and B 
firms. However, municipal authorities may request and be delegated the responsibility for supervision of 
the activities of category A and B firms. Hence, the municipal authorities are responsible for the 
supervision of the activities of category C and U firms and, in some cases, category A and B firms. 
According to Gren and Li (2011), the total number of regulated firms in Sweden amounts to 
approximately 82 000, of which the vast majority, 89%, are category U and C firms, and 10% and 1%, 
respectively, are category B and A firms. Responsibility for these firms is divided among 21 county 
12 
  
  
 
 administration boards and 287 municipal authorities. Supervision of approximately 30% of the category 
A and B firms has been delegated to municipal authorities at their request.  
 
In order to ensure compliance with the Code, the supervision authority can issue any injunctions 
and prohibitions necessary in individual cases. These injunctions and prohibitions may be 
associated with fines. The supervision authorities impose an environmental sanction charge that 
must be paid by business activities that violate rules pursuant to the Code, e.g. by pursuing an 
activity that requires permission or notification but failing to meet this requirement, or by 
neglecting to comply with the terms of a permit or conditions. Finally, infringements of the Code 
or rules issued in pursuance of the Code must be reported to the police or to the public 
prosecution authorities by the supervision authority.  
 
3.2 Description of data 
 
The operationalization of social capital is related to the distinction between cognitive and 
structural components (Putman 2000). The cognitive aspect refers to trust and the structural part 
to links such as networks and associations. Trust, in turn, has been divided into social and 
institutional trust, where the former refers to the perception of others acting in a similar way as 
one self, and the latter is connected with the expectations about institutions’ ability to implement 
and effectively enforce policies (e.g. Jones 2010). In this paper, we use these both the structural 
and cognitive types of social capital by constructing an explanatory variable on organizational 
activity, SOrg, and three variables for trust. One is on trust in   general, SGen, and the other two on 
trust in politicians at the municipal, SMun,, and the national, SNat,, jurisdictional levels.  
 
All four social capital variables are measured at the municipal and the county level, but their 
impact on violation may differ depending on how they stimulate firms’ compliance motives. 
Both SGen and SOrg can affect the calculated motive through the effects on profits, the normative 
motive by influencing the perception on the ethics of compliance, and on the social motive  
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through local society’s appreciation of the firm. Trust in local public institution, SMun, may act on 
the perception about the ability to enforce environmental regulations. Trust in national 
government, SNat, may be of relevance for the opinion about the legitimacy in the environmental 
regulation as such. In all cases, we would expect violation to decrease in the social capital level 
 
Data on all four social capital variables are found in a poll investigation (Holmberg et al. 2011), 
as cardinal measurements. Data on SOrg is obtained from a question where people were asked to 
rank their engagement in organisations on a scale where 1 indicates “not member”, 2 “member 
but have not participated in any meeting last year”, 3 “member and have participated in meeting 
last year”, and 4 “member with some kind of commission”. Measurements of SMun and SNat are 
obtained from questions with a 5 point Likert scale, where ‘1’ is very little trust, and ‘5’ is much 
trust.  The variable SGen, is measured on a cardinal scale between 0 and 10, where 0 is no trust 
and 10 is full trust on ‘people in general’.  
 
Growth rates in social capital are calculated from time series data on our four social capital 
variables in Holmberg et al. (2011). Unfortunately, such data are available for all four social 
capital variables at the earliest from 2000, which does not allow for any econometric estimates of 
the growth rates. Average annual growth rates during the period have therefore been calculated 
for each of the social capital variables.   
 
Data on violation, enforcement and inspection style are not available in official Swedish statistics 
and we therefore obtained these from a survey to inspection officers at 287 municipal authorities 
and 21 county administration boards (Holstein 2010). There is one inspection authority in each 
jurisdiction, and the survey was sent to all authorities. The survey contained questions on 
supervision duty, i.e. number of firms in each category (A, B, C and U) for which the respondent 
was the supervising authority, number of violations, and visits to firms. All questions covered the 
period 2005-2007. Thus, this survey contains data on total firms and firms in different categories, 
NF, inspections,  InsF, and  violations, ViolF, where F=all,A,B,C,U.  
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Of 287 municipal authorities approached, 79 (31%) answered the questionnaire after two follow-
up contacts, while seven (33%) of the 21 county administration boards in Sweden responded. 
One reason for this relatively low response rate can be attributed to the lack of specific 
requirements with respect to the requested data. There is a great variety among the inspection 
authorities with respect to efforts needed to collect the information asked for in the survey. At 
the follow up contacts inspection authorities informed that they did not have necessary resources 
to find and collect the data.  The non-responses may then not be correlated with the number of 
violations or inspections in a community which would bias the results. Nevertheless, we carried 
out test of differences in sample and populations on variables for which these means exist, which 
are presented below in this section. 
 
The municipalities and counties differ considerably with respect to wealth and income where the 
urban regions with the largest cities have the highest average income. This may reflect 
opportunities for firms to earn income, which may have a negative or positive effect on violation. 
Following Earnhaert (2004) we therefore include income per capita, Inc, as an explanatory 
variables. If it reflects firms’ losses of incomes from complying with regulations, it should have 
a positive impact on violation. If it instead is negative, it can be interpreted as profits showing 
firms’ affordability to comply with regulations. In addition, we controlled for environmental 
activity in the community, since it has been shown to affect compliance by firms in Sweden 
(Holstein and Gren 2013). Data on environmental interest, Env, were obtained from a regular 
poll of Swedish citizens’ attitudes in which citizens are asked to state their interest on a scale 
ranging from 1-5, where 1 is the highest and 5 the lowest level of interest  (Holmberg et al. 
2011). In order to control for the relative size of the jurisdictions, we introduced a variable on 
population density, Popdens.  
 
There might also be differences between the two jurisdictional levels, which may influence 
compliance by the category A and B firms. Results from Burby and Paterson (1993) indicated  
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that local enforcement generates higher compliance rate than state enforcement in the US. 
Similar observations were made by Cutter and DeShazo (2007) and Chang et al. (2014) who 
found that enforcement stringency and environmental ambitions are higher in states granted 
authority in the US. We therefore introduce a dummy for inspection authority, Dauth, which is 1 
for a county and 0 for a municipality.  
 
The data constitute a panel of 3 years and 95 jurisdictions. We introduced dummy variables for 
two years, D2005 and D2006. All variables, abbreviations, explanation, and data sources are 
presented in Table 1 followed by descriptive statistics in Table 2. 
 
Table 1: Abbreviations, description of variables and data sources 
 
ViolF         violations of F classified firms where F=all,A,B,C,U (Holstein  
                             2010) 
NF                        number of all firms to be inspected where F=all,A.B,C,U  
                            (Holstein 2010) 
InsfrF                 number of inspections of  F classified firms where F=all,A.B,C,U  
                            (Holstein 2010) 
Inc               income/capita, 1000 SEK/year (SCB 2010) 
Env                      environmental interest, 1 highest and 5 lowest (Holmberg et al.  
                            2011) 
SMun, SNat   trust in municipal and national politicians, 1 lowest and 5 highest 
                             (Holmberg et al. 2011) 
SGen                general trust,  index, 0 to 10  (Holmberg et al. 2011) 
SOrg                organizational engagement, 1 to 5 (Holmberg et al. 2011) 
GrowthK               average growth rate, %, during 2000-2007  in SK where K=  
                             Mun, Nat, Gen, Org 
Popdens     1000 per km2 (SCB, 2013) 
Dauth                 dummy for county inspection 
D2006                 dummy for year 2006 
D2005                 dummy for year 2005 
______________________________________________________ 
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      Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observa
tions 
Mean Stand. 
dev. 
Minimu
m 
Maximum 
Dependent 
variables: 
     
Violall 258 32.64 68.17 0 496 
ViolA 74 1.63 4.73 0 26 
ViolB 197 6.24 16.30 0     88 
ViolC 230 16.42 34.20 0 200 
ViolU 201 14.92 34.18 0 252 
Explanatory 
variables: 
     
Nall 258 232.52 352.26 14 2955 
NA 77 5.49 7.22 1 46 
NB 197 27.39 43.77 1 290 
NC 230 74.86 72.19 2 548 
NU 198 186.63 316.87 7 2339 
Insfrall 258 0.312 0.298 0 1.571 
InsfrA 77 1.228 1.875 0 7.000 
InsfrB 197 0.681 0.689 0 3.631 
InsfrC 230 0.339 0.338 0 1.910 
InsfrU 198 0.219 0.295 0 1.850 
Inc 283 213.20 26.17 174.40 372.10 
Env 285 2.20 0.15 1.91 2.64 
Popdens 285 203.26 676.10 0.78 4248.63 
SMun 285 3.23 0.48 1.00 4.50 
SNat 285 3.09 0.53 1.00 4.50 
SGen 285 6.35 0.37 5.32 7.00 
SOrg 285 1.42 0.09 1.23 1.94 
GrowthMun 285 3.73 6.35 -5.72 32.69 
GrowthNat 285 4.68 8.73 -5.00 45.70 
GrowthGen 285 2.07 4.88 -1.49 18.42 
GrowthOrg 285 1.39 6.92 -1.45 41.57 
 
 
The descriptive statistics show that average number of U-classified firms is approximately 34 times larger 
than that of A-classified firms, which is in line with the entire population measured in early 1990s (Gren 
and Li 2011). On the other hand, the average level of violation among U-classified firms is approximately 
16 times larger than that of A firms. It can also be noted that in average, an A classified firm is inspected 
1.33 times during the three year period, and a U classified firm 0.12 times.  It can also be seen that the  
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average growth is positive for all four social capital variables. Another noteworthy observation is that the 
standard deviations of the response variables are quite large relative to the means which may be an 
indication of over-dispersion. 
Considering that the response rate of the survey was relatively low, even after two follow up surveys, we 
carried out t-tests of the characteristics of the variables SK, Env and Inc, for which we have data on 
population means. The test results showed no significant difference between the sample and population 
means at the 1% level for any of the three years. However, we may still have a selection bias where the 
most interested and active inspection authorities answer the questionnaire. This may be of specific 
relevance for this survey since some respondents answered that much efforts were needed to provide 
answers. Some caution is therefore needed in generalizing the results for entire Sweden, although the test 
results of the variables did not reveal any difference between the sample and population. 
 
4. Econometric models and results 
 
 
In order to test the role of social capital, measured in four different ways, we carried out zero-
inflated negative binomial regressions for each specification. The choice of this method is based 
on the relatively large number of observations with the value zero on the response variable. A 
zero can arise when violation is present but not detected, but also as a true non-existent violation. 
A count data model is therefore used which gives possibilities to test for the two interpretations 
of zeros using an extra component accounting for the surplus of zeros, a so called zero-inflated 
model.  The response variable, number of violating firms, is then characterised as an event count, 
i.e. the realisation of a non-negative positive integer (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Ordinary least 
square method then gives rise to biased and inefficient estimates, and nonlinear models that are 
based on Poisson or negative binomial distributions have therefore been developed (e.g. Long 
1997). A Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution where the probability that an 
event occurs in a given time interval is independent from the occurrence of the last event but at a 
known average rate, implying that the mean equals the variance. Thus, the number of 
occurrences fluctuates around its mean. Since the variance in the response variable is  
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considerably larger than the mean (see Table 2), we tested for a negative binomial regression 
model. The likelihood ratio test resulted in the choice of this model.  
 
A function quadratic in inspections frequency is specified for capturing possible non-linearity, 
and an interaction term between inspection and social capital is introduced for investigating 
complementarity or substitution between the enforcement parameters. The regression equation 
with respect to the logarithm of the mean for all firms and each firm category is then written as: 
 log𝜇𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐾 = 𝛼0𝐹𝐾 + 𝛼1𝐹𝐾Insfr𝑖𝑡𝐹 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐾�Insfr𝑖𝑡𝐹 �2 + 𝛼3𝐹𝐾S𝑖𝐾 + 𝛼4𝐹𝐾Insfr𝑖𝑡𝐹S𝑖𝐾 + 𝛼5𝐹𝐾Growth𝑖𝐾 + 𝛼6𝐹𝐾Inc𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼7𝐹𝐾Env𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐹𝐾 log𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐹 + 𝛼9𝐹𝐾Popdens𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝐹𝐾Dauth + 𝛼11𝐹𝐾D2005 + 𝛼12𝐹𝐾D2006 
 
where i=1,..,n inspection jurisdictions,  F=all, A, B, C, U firm categories and  K=  Gen, Org, 
Mun, Nat as presented in Table 1, Dauth=1 for a county board and 0 for municipalities, D2005 
and D2006 year is 1 for year 2005 and 2006 respectively. The term log𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐹 was included to 
stabilize the ratio 𝜇𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐾/𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐹 , i.e. the fraction of violations with respect to the number of firms to be 
inspected. For a constant ratio, the hypothesis 𝛼8𝐹𝐾 = 1 should hold, which is supported by the 
results in Table 3.  
 
The three different hypotheses derived in Section 2 are tested by the signs of the estimated 
coefficient of relevant variable. According to the first hypothesis we then expect 
0,0 21 <<
FKFK αα , and 03 <
FKα . The second hypothesis is more explorative and  requires 
04 ≠
FKα  for complementarity or substitution in inspections and social capital. The third and last 
hypothesis is not rejected for a statistically significant 05 <
FKα . 
 
The specification of the regression equation may contain statistical problems;  endogeneity, and 
heteroscedasticity.  Endogeneity can be expected in inspections where the choice of inspection  
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can be a result of compliance behaviour (e.g Gray and Shimshack 2011). If so, the estimators 
will not give consistent estimates. We therefore used the instrumental variable (IV) method and 
tested for endogeneity (e.g Davidson and McKinnon 1993). Admittedly, it is difficult to find 
instruments which are correlated with visit frequency but not with the response variable. 
Different instruments were tested, and costs of inspection authorities and area of the jurisdiction 
turned out to be the most valid instruments as revealed from test of over-identification (Table 
A1). However, test results did not show any evidence for inspection frequency to be endogenous 
(Table A1). One reason could be that inspectors follow guidelines provided by the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (Bengtsson 2004). Tests were also carried out for 
heteroscedasticy, which turned out to be present. Therefore, estimates with robust standard errors 
were made for all models.   
 
Estimations of the regression equation without the social capital variables were carried out for 
five different models; ordinary least squares, instrumental variable, random effect model, and the 
Poisson and negative binominal count data models (Table A1). The results were very similar 
among the models with respect to significance and sign of estimated coefficients of the 
independent variables. Test results indicated that the count data models gave the best statistical 
fit, and that the zero-inflated negative binominal model is preferred to the Poisson model (Table 
A1). We therefore used this model to estimate the impacts of social capital variables, Table 3.  
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Table 3: Results from zero inflated negative binomial regression models with robust  
             standard errors and different social capital, SK, variables, p-values in parentheses. 
Variables No social 
capital 
SOrg Trust variables: 
SMun                                  SNat                                   SGen 
Intercept -7.69 (0.00) -2.31 (0.39) -8.77 (0.00) -7.36 (0.01) -12.47(0.00) 
Insfrall 4.09(0.00) 0.04 (0.99) 7.04 (0.00) 4.24 (0.02) 8.88(0.17) 
Insfrall2 -2.03(0.00) -1.59 (0.01) -1.85 (0.00) -2.42 (0.00) -2.60(0.00) 
SK  -3.57 (0.00) 0.46 (0.11) -0.50 (0.08) 0.63(0.19) 
InsfrSKall  2.75 (0.46) -1.02 (0.18) 0.06 (0.91) -0.63(0.53) 
GrowthK  -3.80 (0.00) 0.11 (0.94) -1.86 (0.00) -0.54(0.70) 
Log NAll 0.88 (0.00) 0.97 (0.00) 0.88 (0.00) 0.85 (0.00) 0.90(0.00) 
Inc 0.01(0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01(0.01) 
Env 1.41(0.04) 1.05 (0.14) 1.34 (0.07) 1.94 (0.02) 1.64(0.05) 
Popdens -0.2-3(0.03) -0.16-3(0.11) -0.27-3(0.01) -0.12-3 (0.30) -0.17-3(0.12) 
Dauth -1.44(0.00) -1.72 (0.00) -1.50 (0.00) -1.50 (0.00) -1.68(0.00) 
D2005 0.19(0.34) 0.22 (0.30) 0.20 (0.35) 0.18 (0.33) 0.19(0.34) 
D2006 0.17(0.34) 0.20 (0.27) 0.17 (0.36) 0.20 (0.25) 0.19(0.32) 
Logit:      
Intercept -0.35(0.16) 7.22(0.17) -1.93 (0.05) -1.42 (0.12) -6.49(0.09) 
Insall -0.01(0.05) -0.04(0.10) -0.01 (0.06) -0.01 (0.06) -0.01(0.19) 
SK  -5.52(0.15) 0.48 (0.11) 0.34 (0.24) 0.93((0.12) 
Dauth 0.55(0.35) 2.05 (0.30) 0.63 (0.29) 0.66 (0.25) 0.31(0.72) 
Log pseudo 
Likelihood 
-881.92 -837.40 -879.66 -876.47 -842.30 
Wald 231.51 228.77 240.60 219.54 231.19 
AIC 1791.85 1710.80 1795.33 1788.95 1720.60 
BIC 1841.48 1773.23 1859.14 1852.76 1783.03 
 
 
The variable Insall in the logistic equation is number of inspections. When comparing the 
regression models with and without a social capital variable, we can notice that two of the 
cognitive type social capital variables, the institutional trust variables SMun and SNat, do not 
contribute to the explanatory power as measured by the AIC and BIC tests.  We can also note 
that the sign and significance of the coefficients of most variables in the model without social 
capital are not much affected by the introduction of any social capital variable. Such results are 
the positive and negative sign of the linear and quadratic component of Insfrall, the positive sign 
of LogNAll, and Env, and the negative of Dauth. We would expect violation to increase in number  
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of regulated firms, and decrease in the level of environmental interest (recall that a larger Env 
means less environmental interest). The negative sign of Dauth indicates higher violation 
deterrence from inspections by county administrative boards than municipalities. However, the 
positive sign in the logistic equations instead shows that the country administrative board 
increases the probability of a zero to be a non-detected violation. These results can be compared 
with the findings obtained by Burby and Paterson (1993) and Cutter and DeShazo (2007) who 
showed that local enforcement improve compliance. On the other hand, our results on the impact 
of Dauth in the logistic equation are never significant. 
 
With respect to our first hypothesis, i.e. that violation is decreasing in inspection frequency and 
social capital, the results differ between the social capital variables. When considering only 
inspection frequency, the two opposite signs of Insfr and Insfr2 imply a turning point, the level of 
which is affected by the sign of the interaction term. In the absence of social capital variable, the 
turning point occurs at Insfr=1.01 which is well above the average of 0.31 (Table 2). Except for 
SOrg there are only small changes when adding the social capital variables and evaluating the 
turning at their mean values. On the other hand, the logistic estimates show that inspections 
reduce the probability of a zero reported violation to be a non-detected violation. More 
inspections may then increase the number of detected violations and not necessarily the number 
of violating firms. The first part of our first hypothesis could thus not be supported.  
 
The significant results are more unambiguous for the other part of the first hypothesis, i.e. a 
negative impact of social capital. The coefficients are significant and negative for SOrg and SNat, 
but non-significant and positive for the other two social capital variables. The social capital 
variables are never significant in the logistic equations, which indicate that they have no impact 
on whether a non-detected violation is a true compliance or not. A further investigation of the 
effect of a marginal change in SK shows that it is negative for realistic levels of Insfr for SOrg 
(Insfr<1.30) and SNat (Insfr<8.33) We can thus conclude that the results seem to support the  
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second part of the first hypothesis, i.e. a negative impact on violation from two social capital 
constructs, SOrg and SNat.  
 
The second hypothesis on interaction between Insfr and SK cannot be supported for any social 
capital variable, the interaction term is not significant in any model. On the other hand, 
significant estimates are obtained for two capital growth variables. The negative sign of 
GrowthOrg and GrowthNat , give support to our third and last hypothesis. This is also in line with 
the findings obtained by Langpap and Shimshak (2010).  
 
The different results of the social capital variables and the interaction term can be explained by 
different effects of measures of social capital as such, but also on the existence of 
multicollinearity among InsfrAll and InsfrAllSK, which was revealed by a VIF test. This does not 
affect the predictive properties of the entire model but can influence the estimated coefficients of 
the independent variables and their standard errors. We therefore estimated the regression 
models presented in Table 3 without the interaction term, but the signs of the remaining variables 
were not affected (Table A2). 
 
When estimating the regression equations for the four categories of firms, other potential 
statistical problems arose. Since the dependent variables, one for each firm category, were 
regressed on several common independent variables, there was a risk of contemporaneous 
correlation, creating inefficient estimates of separate regressions. This requires methods 
accounting for such correlations, such as the seemingly unrelated regressions estimate (SURE).  
However, this method does not allow for tests of the zero reports as true non-violations or non-
detected violations. We therefore applied a count data regression model to each firm category, 
but we merged category A and B firms because of the relatively low number of observations in 
these classes. 
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For each firm category regressions are made in the same way as for all firms, i.e. with and 
without a social capital variable. The results of these regressions are shown in Tables A3-A5. 
The results for each firm category without any social capital variable were very similar to that of 
all firms. The estimates improved when adding a social capital variable in almost all cases, but to 
different degrees. In Table 4 we present results for SOrg which turned out to give the best 
statistical results  as measured by AIC and BIC for all three firm categories.  
 
    Table 4:  Regression results with SOrg  for different firm categories with zero  
                    inflated negative binominal model, p-values in parentheses. 
Variables A+B firms 
 
C firms 
 
U firms 
 
Intercept -19.71(0.11) -6.80(0.03) 1.85(0.71) 
InsfrF -3.72(0.65) 23.12(0.00) -3.04(0.70) 
InsfrF2 -1.17 (0.00) -1.01(0.01) -0.52(0.28) 
SOrg 2.92 (0.76) 0.85(0.59) -3.37(0.02) 
InsfrFSOrg 5.36 (0.39) -14.38(0.00) 3.77(0.51) 
GrowthOrg -4.58 (0.02) -1.38(0.34) -4.61(0.00) 
Log NF 1.20 (0.00) 1.21(0.00) 0.50(0.00) 
Inc -0.01 0.59) 10.7-3(0.04) 0.01(0.03) 
Env 6.11 (0.05) 0.11(0.88) 0.16(0.89) 
Popdens 3.5-3(0.06) -0.03-3(0.71) -0.7-(0.00) 
Dauth -2.10 (0.00)   
D2005 -0.16 (0.72) 0.04(0.85) 0.62(0.04) 
D2006 -0.18 (0.70) 0.18(0.30) 0.14(0.54) 
Logit:    
Intercept -46.97(0.01) 1.70(0.82) 5.23(0.08) 
InsF -0.1-3 0.05) -7.5-3(0.25) -0.04(0.01) 
SOrg 11.63 (0.01) -1.32(0.36) -3.26(0.11) 
Dauth 2.52 (0.15)   
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
-205.06 -601.30 -491.32 
Wald 161.34 268.72 155.14 
AIC 446.12 1234.59 1014.65 
BIC 495.84 1288.59 1066.43 
     Source: Tables A3-A5 
 
 
The regression results for different firm categories reveal some differences and similarities with 
respect to our variables of main interest. One difference is that both the linear and quadratic  
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components of inspection frequency are negative for the large and small firm categories, but not 
for category C firms.  
 
The social capital variable measured as civic engagement seems to act as complementary to 
formal enforcement for category C firms and as substitute for the other categories. However, the 
relatively large coefficient values of InsfrC and the interaction terms reveal that this could be a 
result from existence of multicollinearity in the equation. When estimating the regression 
equation without the interaction term, we obtain significant and negative estimate of SOrg. 
Another difference is that SOrg is significant and negative only for category U firms. A common 
result for all firm categories is the negative sign of GrowthSOrg, which is significant for category 
A+B and U firm. This is true also for InsF in the logistic equations, which indicate that both 
formal and informal enforcement reduce the probability of a zero reported violation to be a non-
detected violation.    
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper analysed, theoretically and empirically, the impact of social capital on violation of 
environmental regulations. A simple dynamic model with violation as disinvestment in social 
capital was constructed to identify mechanisms of impact and to derive testable hypotheses. Two 
main channels of social capital influence were identified; through interdependence between 
formal and informal enforcement which could be either complementary or substitutes, and 
through future decreases in profits from degradation of social capital.  
 
Four different social capital variables were constructed in the empirical test on data from a 
survey to inspection authorities at the municipal and county board levels in Sweden; general 
trust, institutional trust in politicians at the municipal and national levels, and organisational 
activities.  Count data regression models were used, and robust results were that violation is 
decreasing in growth of all social capital variables. In general, the statistically best results were  
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obtained for organizational activity. A small difference appeared between firm categories where 
relatively small firms responded by reducing violation for social capital measured by civic 
engagement, but such results were not significant the other firm categories. One reason could be 
that small firms are more dependent on local civic engagement. 
 
With respect to the relation between formal and informal enforcement as measured by the 
interaction between inspection frequency and any of the social capital variables, significant 
results were obtained only for specific firm categories where civic engagement tended to act as 
complement for the middle sized firms. This result is in line with Yamamura (2009) who found 
complementarity between formal enforcement and different social capital constructs in terms of 
civic engagement for reductions in crime rates in Japan.  
 
The insignificant result of the interaction between inspections and social capital was in contrast 
to the robust results of inspection frequency, inspection authority, and community characteristics 
in terms of income/capita and environmental interest. All models showed a negative impact on 
violation at higher inspection level, which support the results of most other studies (Gray and 
Shimchack 2011). Another robust result was that reported violations are lower when the 
inspection is carried out by county boards, but this can be a result of non-detected violation 
rather than violation deterrence. This result partly supports the findings by Burby and Paterson 
(1993) and Cutter and DeShazo (2007). However, our data set only included seven county 
administration boards which may not be sufficient for an evaluation of the devolution policy.   
 
We can thus conclude that our results support earlier findings of the impacts of inspections and 
social capital on violation deterrence, but also add some new findings. The most robust results 
were the negative impact of growth in social capital on violation, which indicate that firms 
consider future effects on profits from disinvestment in social capital. With respect to the 
interaction between abundance of social capital and formal inspections, we obtained significant 
results only for the middle sized firms. However, the introduction of the interaction term did  
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create statistical problems with multicollinearity, which put some doubts on the results of the 
coefficient estimate of this term. Further, different social capital variables may act in 
combination as suggested by Jackson (2011), which has not been considered in this study.   
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Appendix: Tables 
 
 
Table A1: Results from alternative regression models for all firm categories and without social 
capital,  robust standard error,        n=256.  
Variables OLS  IV a (n=119) Random effect 
modelb 
Poisson, zero-
inflatedc 
Intercept -139.31(0.01) -236.82(0.06) -126.14(0.10) -10.01 (0.00) 
InsfrAll 139.52(0.00) 286.78(0.26) 83.12 (0.00) 4.60 (0.01) 
InsfrAll2 -99.90(0.00) -210.54(0.30) -47.32 (0.00) -2.65 (0.00) 
NAll (Log NAll for 
count model) 
0.05(0.00) 0.06(0.00) 0.05(0.03) 0.91 (0.00) 
Inc 0.17(0.06) 0.36 (0.06) 0.20(0.17) 0.02 (0.00) 
Env 44.08 (0.04) 57.66 (0.08) 40.12 (0.20) 2.07(0.00) 
Popdens -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.00) -0.02 (0.05) -0.1-30.23) 
Dauth -19.68(0.00) -45.54(0.06) -20.12 (0.01) -1.23 (0.00) 
D2005 4.01 (0.61) 7.46 (0.48) 2.14(0.66) 0.29 (0.16) 
D2006 2.45 (0.75) 6.12 (0.54) 0.88(0.85) 0.17(0.35) 
Logit:     
Intercept    -0.14(0.47) 
InsAll    -0.01(0.01) 
Dauth    0.69(0.15) 
     
Wald   27.12 182.62 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.05 0.18  
LL -1356.56 -627.21  -3061.92 
AIC 2733.12 1274.41  6149.85 
BIC 2768.57 1302.20  6195.93 
   a Hansen J statistic of over identification resulted in p=0.777, and Wu-Hausman test of  
       endogeneity  gave p=0.570. 
   b Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects gives p=0.000. 
   c Voung test of zero inflated variable p=0.000. 
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Table A2: Results from zero inflated negative binomial regression models with  
                  robust standard errors and different social capital, SK, variables without  
                  the interaction term.  
Variables SOrg Trust variables: 
SMun                            SNat                             SGen 
Intercept -1.44 (0.62) -8.14(0.00) -7.45(0.00) -11.47(0.00) 
InsfrAll 3.75 (0.00) 3.99 (0.00) 4.41 (0.00) 4.51(0.00) 
InsfrAll2 -1.88 (0.01) -1.94 (0.00) -2.42 (0.00) -2.61(0.00) 
SK -3.47(0.00) 0.18 (0.36) -0.47 (0.01) 0.47(0.15) 
GrowthK -3.42(0.00) 0.49 (0.74) -1.86 (0.00) -0.45(0.75) 
Log NAll 0.92 (0.00) 0.89 (0.00) 0.85 (0.00) 0.84(0.00) 
Inc 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01(0.01) 
Env 0.82 (0.23) 1.33 (0.08) 1.96 (0.01) 1.81(0.02) 
Popdens -0.20-3(0.08) -0.24-3(0.02) -0.12-3 (0.27) -0.17-3(0.11) 
Dauth -1.36 (0.00) -1.38 (0.00) -1.49 (0.00) -1.47(0.00) 
D2005 0.21(0.36) 0.20(0.35) 0.19 (0.33) 0.18(0.41) 
D2006 0.19(0.27) 0.17(0.36) 0.20 (0.26) 0.21(0.27) 
Logit:     
Intercept 17.51(0.07) -1.94 (0.05) -1.45 (0.11) -11.37(0.06) 
Insall -0.05(0.14) -0.01(0.06) -0.01 (0.05) -0.05(0.06) 
SK -12.60(0.07) 0.48 (0.10) 0.35 (0.22) 1.75(0.06) 
NAll     
Dauth 2.09 (0.26) 0.67 (0.27) 0.69 (0.11) 1.60(0.22) 
Log pseudo 
Likelihood 
-838.36 -880.49 -876.41 -843.12 
Wald 197.19 234.08 221.11 205.88 
AIC 1710.67 1794.98 1786.82 1720.23 
BIC 1769.67 
 
1855.25 1847.09 1779.19 
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Table A3: Results from zero inflated Negative binominal model with robust  
             standard errors and different social capital variables for category A+B   
            firms,  (n=130 and non-zero 43)  
Variables No social 
capitala 
SOrg Trust variables: 
SMun                       SNat                       SGen 
Intercept -18.49(0.17) -19.71(0.11) -15.25 (0.03) -14.35 (0.04) 23.74(0.48) 
InsfrA+B 4.13 (0.00) -3.72(0.65) 5.90 (0.13) 5.82 (0.00) -27.75 (0.20) 
InsfrA+B2 -1.19 (0.00) -1.17 (0.00) -1.31 (0.00) -1.70 (0.00) -0.81 (0.08) 
SK  2.92 (0.76) -2.17 (0.26) -1.58 (0.11) -5.99 (0.10) 
InsfrSKA+B  5.36 (0.39) -0.42 (0.70) -0.04 (0.93) 4.86 (0.14) 
GrowthK  -4.58 (0.02) -17.13 (0.02) -12.58 (0.08) -3.19 (0.44) 
Log NA+B 1.31 (0.00) 1.20 (0.00) 1.36 (0.00) 1.38 (0.00) 1.20 (0.00) 
Inc -0.02 (0.24) -0.01 0.59) -0.03 (0.00) -0.04 (0.01) -0.03 (0.14) 
Env 8.02 (0.13) 6.11 (0.05) 11.32 (0.00) 10.49 (0.00) 8.31 (0.01) 
Popdens 2.18-3 0.29) 3.5-3(0.06) -1.97-3(0.21) -1.1-3 (0.40) -3.2-3 (0.21) 
Dauth -1.98 (0.02) -2.10 (0.00) -3.15 (0.00) -2.82 (0.00) -1.86 (0.02) 
D2005 -0.10 (0.81) -0.16 (0.72) -0.43 (0.24) -0.28 (0.45) -0.61 (0.31) 
D2006 -0.04 (0.89) -0.18 (0.70) -0.26 (0.46) -0.28 (0.40) -0.32 (0.50) 
Logit:      
Intercept -0.9-3 (0.00) -46.97(0.01) 6.93 (0.06) -4.19 (0.19) 10.21 (0.17) 
InsA+B -0.08-(0.04) -0.1-3 0.05) -0.08-3(0.00) -0.08-3(0.04) -0.07-3(0.04) 
SK  11.63 (0.01) -2.25 (0.06) 1.41 (0.21)    -1.66(0.17) 
Dauth 2.07 (0.21) 2.52 (0.15) 2.06 (0.26) 2.42 (0.15) 1.82 (0.25) 
Log 
pseudo 
likelihood 
-228.47 -205.06 -222.71 -220.90 -212.35 
Wald 129.24 161.34 207.79 151.34 134.75 
AIC 473.73 446.12 481.42 477.80 460.71 
BIC 507.76 495.84 532.48 528.86 510.43 
     a Voung test gives p=0.005, and a LR test of Poisson versus negative binominal  
       distribution gives p=0.000 
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           Table A4: Results from zero inflated negative binominal regression models 
                            with robust standard errors and different social capital variables  
                           for category C  firms,   n=229  (109)  
Variables No social 
capitala 
SOrg Trust variables: 
SMun                            SNat                       SGen 
Intercept -7.30(0.00) -6.80(0.03) -7.33(0.00) -5.790(0.00) -9.54(0.00) 
InsfrC 2.54(0.00) 23.12(0.00) 1.33(0.42) -0.42(0.82) 10.90(0.02) 
InsfrC2 -0.47(0.30) -1.01(0.01) -0.56(0.22) -0.62(0.08) -0.75(0.07) 
SK  0.85(0.59) -0.03(0.91) -0.68(0.03) 0.47(0.26) 
InsfrSKC  -14.38(0.00) 0.41(0.44) 1.02(0.09) -1.25(0.08) 
GrowthK  -1.38(0.34) -0.62(0.65) -1.07(0.01) 0.34(0.82) 
Log NC 1.08(0.00) 1.21(0.00) 1.10(0.00) 0.98(0.00) 1.07(0.00) 
Inc 7.5-3(0.18) 10.7-3(0.04) -6.2-3(0.29) 7.8-3(0.18) 9.12-3(0.14) 
Env 1.50(0.03) 0.11(0.88) 1.63(0.03) 1.91(0.01) 0.98(0.24) 
Popdens -0.01-3(0.89) -0.03-3(0.71) -0.03-3(0.77) 0.13-3(0.32) -0.02-3(0.84) 
D2005 -0.01(0.96) 0.04(0.85) -0.01(0.95) -0.03(0.89) -0.05(0.82) 
D2006 0.13(0.47) 0.18(0.30) 0.13(0.47) 0.14(0.42) 0.14(0.46) 
Logit:      
Intercept -0.06(0.76) 1.70(0.82) -1.75(0.06) -1.46(0.09) -5.25(0.05) 
InsC -7.2-3(0.18) -7.5-3(0.25) -6.2-3(0.29) -0.01(0.31) -6.4-3(0.32) 
SK  -1.32(0.36) 0.52(0.06) 0.45(0.10) 0.79(0.06) 
Log 
pseudo 
likelihood 
-629.33 -601.30 -627.27 -6224.15 -606.12 
Wald 179.63 268.72 216.22 259.22 165.37 
AIC 1282.67 1234.59 1286.53 1280.31 1244.25 
BIC 1323.87 1288.59 1341.47 1335.25 1298.05 
     a Voung test gives p=0.000 and LR test of Poisson versus negative binominal p=0.000 
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Table A5: Results from zero inflated negative binominal regression models with  
                  robust standard errors and different social capital variables for category  
                 U  firms,    n=197 (102) Voung p=0.00 LR p=0.00  
Variables No social 
capital 
SOrg Trust variables: 
SMun                   SNat                  STrust 
Intercept -4.40(0.05) 1.85(0.71) -6.60(0.04) -4.34(0.09) -1.02(0.85) 
InsfralU 2.58(0.00) -3.04(0.70) 5.34(0.00) 3.42(0.00) -4.25(0.47) 
InsfraU2 -0.82(0.03) -0.52(0.28) -0.52(0.16) -0.85(0.01) -0.89(0.01) 
SK  -3.37(0.02) 0.50(0.08) -0.23(0.42) -0.49(0.43) 
InsfrSKU  3.77(0.51) -0.97(0.03) -0.28(0.26) 1.09(0.23) 
GrowthK  -4.61(0.00) 0.26(0.89) -2.12(0.00) -4.25(0.17) 
Log NU 0.49(0.00) 0.50(0.00) 0.53(0.00) 0.53(0.00) 0.46(0.00) 
Inc 0.02(0.01) 0.01(0.03) 0.02(0.02) 0.02(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 
Env 0.60(0.49) 0.16(0.89) 0.47(0.64) 0.87(0.40) 0.73(0.52) 
Popdens -0.7-(0.00) -0.7-(0.00) -0.8-(0.00) -0.7-3(0.00) -0.8-3(0.00) 
D2005 0.70(0.02) 0.62(0.04) 0.73(0.02) 0.70(0.01) 0.72(0.02) 
D2006 0.18(0.44) 0.14(0.54) 0.19(0.41) 0.20(0.37) 0.18(0.43) 
Logit:      
Intercept 0.62(0.01) 5.23(0.08) 0.01(0.99) -1.57(0.13) 6.49(0.08) 
InsA -0.03(0.00) -0.04(0.01) -0.03(0.01) -0.03(0.01) -0.04(0.00) 
SK  -3.26(0.11) 0.19(0.61) 0.70(0.03) -0.92(0.11) 
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
-506.85 -491.32 -505.06 -500.63 -492.76 
Wald 160.62 155.14 160.60 231.04 164.53 
AIC 1037.73 1014.65 1042.13 1033.26 1017.52 
BIC 1077.13 1066.43 1094.66 1085.79 1069.31 
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